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Aristotle on Good and Bad Actualities1 (Draft)
Owen Goldin 
Marquette University 
This paper is a discussion of one of the more neglected 
passages in the central books of Ac istotle*s Metaphysics, Θ  9 
105la4~19. In this passage Aristotle makes some assertions 
concerning relations that hold among potentialities and 
actualities, both good and bad. These assertions seem to be made 
as an afterthought, and their relation to the analysis of 
potentiality and actuality that precedes is unclear. I shall 
argue that in this passage Aristotle is in effect providing a 
metaphysical foundation for the normative component of a 
teleological analysis of composite substance.
I consider certain difficulties in reconciling the text with 
the account of potentiality, and actuality presented earlier in 
MetaphysicsΘ . I then briefly explore some of the implications 
that this passage has for our understanding of Aristotelian 
teleology.
Ï
In Metaphysics Φ  9, 105Xa4-19, Aristotle writes:
It is clear from the following considerations that the 
actuality is better and more valuable ( Μ *  β^Τΐ.** V KAt 
T^ /<(unrEf)<4than the good ((Tïïôvid^S ) potentiality. Whatever
1 This paper is an expansion and revision of a paper 
presented to the Metaphysical Society of America, at Notre Dame 
University, March 13, 1993. I thank all of those who responded
to that version in public and in private'. Special thanks are due 
to David O ’Connor, for the probing insights and challenges of his 
prepared comment.
3correlated. In what sense is a potentiality good? Is Aristotle 
talking about a potentiality for a good? Or is he talking about 
an ability or disposition that is good insofar as it is 
especially conducive to its correlative actuality? As so often, 
the conclusion for which Aristotle is arguing becomes clear only 
by tracing the course of the argument.
II
This argument begins by with the assertion that whenever a 
potentiality for some X inheres in a subject, the potentiality 
for the contrary of X likewise inheres in that subject.
Aristotle presents the example of a living body. By virtue of 
being a living body, it has both the potentiality for good health 
and the potentiality for bad health.. But on what basis is 
Aristotle able to say that all potentialities work in the same 
way? Aristotle's reasons are presented in the previous chapter,
Θ 8, in which he argues that actuality is prior to potentiality 
on the grounds that the necessary eternal motions, on which all 
other motions depend, involve no potentiality.2 This is so, he 
says, because "everything which is potentially admits of not 
being in actuality" (Tb Swarov S\ ffSv ivSefarai. ¿ντρ/φν); 
accordingly, potential beings are perishable (1050bl0-ll). Here 
J v /ΛΤον does not have the sense of the logically possible, 
that which is not impossible. Rather, it denotes a metaphysical
2 The reliance on this earlier argument is an indication 
that the argument of Θ  9 is not an unrelated observation simply 
tacked onto Metaph.Θ , as may first appear.
5potentiality to heat but not to chill, and the cold has a 
potentiality to chill but not to heat, one with an art has the 
potentiality to produce both the product of that art and its 
contrary. This point, familiar from Plato's Republic (I 333E - . 
334B)4 is explained by the fact that one with an art has an 
account by virtue of which one understands the cause of the 
coming-to-be of the product of that art. One would be in a 
position to ensure that the product of that art would be absent 
through the purposeful withholding or removal of the cause of 
that product. Because not every subject is such as can accept 
the product of that art, being deficient in respects to the 
product of that art is a contrary, not a contradictory, to having - 
that product. This is why a rational potentiality such as an art ■ 
is correlative to contraries.
Hence rational potentialities stand in contrast to *
nonrational potentialities, each of which is correlative to one 
and only one effect. Aristotle elsewhere makes clear that if a 
nonrational potentiality is brought together with an object on 
which it can produce its effect, it is just that effect, not its 
opposite, that will be produced (Metapb. Θ  5 1048a6-7). But if 
an artisan and that on which the artisan can work are brought 
together, it is not necessarily the case that the product of the
Cf. Meno 87e-88d and Ion 531d-532b.
7Returning to 0 9, we see that one of Aristotle's examples of 
a single potentiality that is a potentiality for contraries is 
indeed an instance of a rational potentiality: the potentiality 
that allows one to build a house is that which allows one to 
demolish a house. (This is explained by the fact that one must 
know the cause of the internal coherence and stability of a house 
in order to build one. With such a knowledge its coherence and 
stability can be easily removed.) But how are the other examples 
to be accounted for?
We note that when Aristotle states the principle that every 
potentiality is the principle of only one change, he concentrates 
on those principles that he takes to be potentialities in the 
strict sense of the term: principles of motion or change in 
something else or in a thing itself insofar as it is something 
else. These are the active potentialities, such as heat, cold, 
or the soul. In Θ 1 Aristotle distinguishes these from passive 
potentialities. A passive potentiality is that feature of a 
substrate that is the principle of its being acted upon and 
changed, were it to come into requisite contact with the
longer exists, expect "potentially." Such a move does make a 
positive step in resolving some of the ontological difficulties 
of the central books. On this see M. L. Gill, Aristotle on 
Substance: the Paradox of Unity (Princeton, 1989). But it 
involves problems of its own, insofar as it threatens the 
Aristotelian solution to the problem of coming-to-be and passing 
away: it becomes unclear exactly how there is a truly persistent 
substrate. Aristotle is not always consistent on the question of 
the pre-existence and survival of matter as such. Accordingly, 
this passage alone does not tell against the thesis that within 
Metaph. B  , the contrary to an actualized form is simply the 
privation of that form within the matter that accepts the form.
9anything internal to the subject about to be heated or cooled. 
There is no metaphysical principle of being heated apart from 
that of being cooled. This will also be the case for those 
passive potentialities correlative to complex actualities, such 
as health and disease.
I suggest that Aristotle’s assertion that the same 
potentiality is correlated to contrary actualities holds for both 
rational, potentialities and passive potentialities.. One may well 
ask why Aristotle does not come out and say this, if this is 
indeed his meaning. Why does he not explicitly assert that this 
principle does not hold for the remaining logical possibility, 
that of two active potentialities, correlated to contrary 
actualities?
I propose that this is because, in the last analysis, 
Aristotle does not admit that such a case is metaphysically 
possible. Whenever there is a pair of contrary actualities, 
there be a real metaphysical principle of causation for only one 
of these. For only one actuality is there a real active 
potentiality by virtue of which this actuality emerges. The 
other actuality is merely what is predicated of the substrate 
when this substrate does not stand in the required relation to 
such potentiality, or when the active potentiality is in some way 
otherwise prevented from doing its work. Granted, Aristotle 
could have been more clear and explicit on the premises of his 
reasoning. But an argument is available for this conclusion that 
rests on premises all of which would have been accepted by ·
11
the potentialities standing in a certain relation is not met, Y 
will be inherent in X. To return to the example of health, the 
matter of a sapling has the potentiality attaining the final 
cause of being a tree, that is, being all and doing all that is 
involved in being a mature, flourishing tree. We can call this 
goal the healthy life of the tree. (Health is the permanent 
state by virtue of which this life is led; it in turn comes about 
through the living of a healthy life.) The active potentiality 
is the form of the tree, its soul, already within the sapling.
If the sapling is not given enough water or light, it will be 
unable to fully meet this goal. The tree’s active potentiality 
will be prevented from standing in the appropriate relation to 
its passive potentiality. To that extent it will have predicated 
of it the contrary of the "healthy life," that is, it will be 
living unhealthily.
In such a case there is no need to posit an active 
potentiality for the contrary of X. Those agencies that do seem 
to be actively responsible for the contrary of X (such as drought 
or logging, in the case of the tree) can be understood as having 
their causal power because they make impossible the proper 
functioning on S of the active potentialities for X.
It should therefore be no surprise that in the argument 
being considered Aristotle omits considering the possibility of 
two different potentialities, each directed toward one of a pair 
of contrary actualities.
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our passage is said to not be as good or valuable as the 
actuality, must be understood as good insofar as it is a 
potentiality for some good. Second, the neutrality of the 
potentiality in respect to goodness or badness is contrasted with 
the case of actualities, because in that case, Aristotle says, 
one must be good and the other bad. This is a rather strong 
claim. Will not many actualities be neutral in respect to 
goodness and badness? We need to return to this point.
Aristotle concludes by inferring that “it is therefore clear 
that there is no badness apart from things. For the bad is 
posterior in nature to the potentiality." What does this mean, 
and on what grounds is it argued?
First, what problem is this meant to address? In the 
previous chapter, Aristotle had argued that actuality is prior to 
potentiality in λθ/θ£, in time, and in OUT<A. But if this is so, 
a problem arises in the cases of good actualities that aré 
correlative to contrary bad actualities. For, as we have, seen, 
in the case of rational potentialities and nonrational passive 
potentialities, a good actuality and its contrary, a bad 
actuality, share one and the same potentiality. It would appear, 
then, that both the good and the bad actualities share the status 
of priority in λοροζ , time, and OU^tA to the potentiality to 
which they are both correlated. This would entail a kind of 
metaphysical Manicheism, according to which both good and bad 
principles are implicit in a complete account of a potentiality, 
temporarily precede its coming-to-be, and are implicitly present
15
art {which in turn is posterior to actual health both in time and 
in essence) must already exist before it is employed to make 
patients unhealthy. Hence we have the temporal priority of the 
potentiality, as veil as priority in 0^<r¿A, taken either in the 
sense of definitional essence or in the sense of reality.
The situation of nonrational potentialities correlated with 
good or bad actualities is simpler. Since the good actuality X 
and the bad actuality Y are contraries, there will be the same 
passive potentiality for each. Y is simply the absence of X in 
the subject S, which is such as to admit of X. Y is therefore 
conceptually and metaphysically derivative on S, which is defined 
as that with the potentiality for X. Likewise, as we have seen, 
Aristotle would be led to deny the existence of a separate active 
nonrational potentiality for Y. Y, the bad actuality, is simply 
what one has when the relevant nonrational passive potentiality 
for X, the good actuality, is not actualized. In the case of 
active nonrational potentialities, too, the bad actuality will be 
metaphysically and conceptually posterior to the single 
potentiality involved.
V
We have seen evidence for attributing to Aristotle the view 
that, with possible exceptions at the elemental level, all 
contraries are such that one is a positive attribute and the 
other the privation of that attribute. The actualized privation 
has no contrary with any independent ontological status. Certain 
such privations are called "bad" insofar as they are contrary to
17
of the opposition often appears to not exist at all. For 
while there is something divine and good and desired, ve say 
that on the one hand the contrary to this exists, and on the 
other hand, that there exists that which by nature desires 
and craves this, according to its nature. But for them it 
turns out that the contrary craves its perishing. Yet the 
form cannot desire itself, since there is no need, nor can 
the opposite desire the form, since contraries are 
destructive of each other. But that which desires the form 
is matter, just as the female might desire the male, or the 
ugly might desire the beautiful. But in this case, the 
matter would be female or ugly only accidentally. (192al2- 
25)
There is a great deal going on in this famous passage.
Three main questions present themselves. First, exactly what is 
the argument against the Platonists, stripped of metaphorical 
embellishment and normative talk? Second, what sense can be 
given to the apparent identification of all actualities as good? 
Third, do the roles played by goodness and badness in this 
passage lend support to the interpretation of good and bad 
actualities, sketched above?
On Aristotle*s account, the Eleatic argument that nothing 
comes from nothing convinced the Platonists that there needs to 
be something underlying change, which is not the same as the end
good.
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hand, Aristotle insists that, unlike that of the Platonists, "ve 
say that the contrary , . . exists** {To ç v a v t l o v  (ftytv tivoi,
192al7-18). Were this not so, Aristotle vould not have been 
taking pains to argue that it, along with the substrate, must be 
counted as a principle of change. It is rather the Platonists 
who move from the "malignance** of the privation to its non-being. 
What sense can be made of such an inference?
The answer can be only speculative, since the first explicit 
Platonic argument identifying evil and nonbeing seems to be that 
of Plotinus (Ennead 2.4), who employs the Aristotelian conceptual 
machinery of matter, potentiality, and actuality to argue for 
this conclusion. But we can be reminded that, at least in the 
metaphysics of the Republic, it is the form of the Good that is 
ultimately responsible for all being. This is, as Santas has 
shown,** the form of being a form, the form of Being, in the 
strict sense. It would follow that any being, in the strict 
sense, would be good, and hence productive of good. So to the 
extent to which something is malignant, it is not!
We might be tempted to read Aristotle SsUkl^alltalk of 
goodness in a metaphysical context as a kind of superstitious 
Platonism. But Aristotle does not argue in this way. He joins 
the Platonists in calling the positive terra of change something 
"divine, good, and desired.w His argument is only that we need
ig G. Santas, "The Form of the Good in Plato's Republic," in 
J. P. Anton and A. Preus, eds.. Essays in Ancient Greek 
Philosophy, vol. 2 (Albany, 1983), pp. 232-263.
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to be good. The point being made is that it is not ugliness as 
such that becomes beautiful, but whatever it is that is ugly. It 
is not badness as such that becomes good, but whatever it is that 
is bad.
In order to understand how this is so, we need only consider 
desire, as it emerges in our human lives. We want what it is 
that ve do not have, but do not utterly lose our identity were we 
to succeed. In support of this reading of the passage as 
developing a metaphor is the fact that, within his biological and 
psychological writings, Aristotle is clear that desire ),
in the strict sense, is a faculty possessed only by animals {DA 
II 3 414a29-bl6). But there are many substrates of change that 
are not animals. So in saying that something is good we are 
saying that there is some substrate which is related to it as is 
the substrate of desire towards the object or attribute desired. 
One version of such an account would posit goodness as nothing 
but the object of desire (cf. NE I 1 1094al-3). Any ascription 
of goodness would thereby be dependent on the speaker's 
interests, or desires. Goodness as such would have no 
independent ontological status. When we call something good ve 
are simply saying that ve, the speakers, have a certain 
potentiality of desire directed towards it, or we are indulging 
in a bit of harmless anthropomorphizing in ascribing such desire 
to some other substrate.
We will return to this issue shortly. This text, alone, is 
neutral between these two readings. But whichever is correct.
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In regard to this second question, there appear to be tvo 
main alternatives. According to the first, goodness is a real 
Irreducible attribute of things; a complete account of something 
that is good will need to mention its goodness, in addition to 
all of its other attributes. On the other account, the goodness 
of a being is to be identified with some other characteristic of 
that being, which can be accounted for in non-normative language 
Such an account was suggested by Balmeu and has been fully 
argued for by Gotthelf.*2 According to this account, the good of 
a being is simply the actualization of all of its irreducible 
potentialities, determined by that being's form. So if 
teleological explanation proceeds by shoving hov some attribute 
or activity is for the sake of an organism's good, it in effect 
shows hov this attribute or activity either makes possible or 
facilitates the activities in vhich that organism can by nature 
engage.
The tvo sets problems are to a certain extent interrelated. 
If a complete explanation of the activities and characteristics 
can in principle be given by identifying the underlying material 
stuffs and their natural characteristics, both form as such and 12
11 D. M. Balme, "Teleology and Necessity," in A. Gotthelf 
and J. G. Lennox, eds., Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's 
Biology (Cambridge, 1987), p. 277.
12Ä. Gotthelf, "Aristotle’s Conception of Pinal Causality," 
in Gotthelf and Lennox, pp. 233-234, and "The Place of the Good 
in Aristotle's Natural Teleology," in J. J. Cleary and D. C. 
Shartin, eds.. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in 
Ancient Philosophy, vol. 4 (Latham, Hd., 1989), pp. 113-139.
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comes about on account of some "irreducible potentiality."
One of the results of the present paper is that a careful 
consideration of those few texts in vhich Aristotle does consider 
the relationships that hold among goodness, badness, 
potentiality, and actuality shows that this objection is 
unfounded.18 Badness is simply the privation of some actuality 
that is good.
The refutation of this objection does not in itself clinch 
the case that there is nothing metaphysically involved in 
goodness other than actuality as such. There is another key 
objection, vhich I am not able to here address. This is that 
Aristotle sets up a hierarchy of actualities, so that some are of 
more value or have a greater share of the divine than others. Is 
this simply an extension of the metaphor of the scale of nature, 
by vhich some beings have greater complexity and a quantitatively 
greater range of actualities than others?1* Or is the high 
regard in vhich Aristotle holds those actualities that involve 
awareness, continuity, and eternity a sign of an irreducibly 
normative element within his ontology? A third possibility, 
vhich ve cannot dismiss out of hand, is that Aristotle never gave 
sustained attention to this issue, to vhich ve, living in the *16
18 In "The Place of the Good," pp. 116-117, Gotthelf 
defends himself against Kahn's criticism by pointing out 
imprécisions in Kahn's expression of the objection, but does not 
directly address the question of the metaphysical status of good 
and bad actualities as such.
16 This is the suggestion of Gotthelf, "The Place," p. 128.
